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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MECHAM et al. 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 9159 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LUDLOW PLUMBING 
SUPPLY CO. 
In Respondent's statement (page 4) it contends that 
Appellant did not in the original pleading nor in the two 
amended pleadings of each of the three cases pray for the 
foreclosure of its whole lien by a sale of all the property 
covered by its lien, and to which it claimed to have furnished 
materials, and the "bond law" wasn't mentioned. We do not 
agree with this statement. In paragraph 3 of its prayer in 
the Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Appellant 
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prays for judgment that the lien of Appellant be decreed 
superior to that of Respondent and for a sale of the property, 
and in paragraph 4 of the prayer Appellant prays for judg-
ment against Mecham, and against plaintiff and Cross-defend-
ants for any deficiency. In paragraph 4 of the Third Defense 
in each case Appellant alleges that plaintiff had not required 
a bond from defendant, Robert B. Mecham, as required by 
Title 14-2-2, UCA 1953, and again in paragraph 6 of the 
Third Defense Appellant alleges that upon Cross-Defendant 
D. Spencer Grow learning of his and plaintiffs together with 
the other Cross-Defendants liability created by Section 14-2-2, 
UCA 1953, Cross-defendant, D. Spencer Grow, changed his 
proposal, and proposed to Robert B. Mecham that Mecham 
secure a tract of land for construction of proposed sub-
divisions, etc. Of course Appellant could not ask the court 
in these actions to order a sale of that property which was 
not brought before the court by the foreclosure actions of 
Respondent when Appellant was brought into the action as a 
defendant by Respondent. 
It is surprising that Respondent represents that Appel-
lant did not bring before the court cross-defendant D. Spen-
cer Grow and the other cross-defendants named in the title of 
Appellant's answer and cross-complaint. All of the cross 
defendants named filed their pleading to the cross-complaint 
in the form of a reply and at no time during the trial of the 
case did Respondent contend that these parties were not 
before the court. 
Respondent sets out at pages 5 and 6 of its brief cer-
tain findings of the court (a) and (b) referring to Key-
ridge properties and (d) referring to a parcel of land in 
Provo, Utah. None of these properties were in issue in any 
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of the three actions, it having been pointed out by Appellant 
in its original brief that Appellant seeks to foreclose its lien 
as to the Keyridge properties covered by Appellant's liert 
in another action now pending in the district court. 
At page 7 of Respondent's brief Respondent contends 
that because Appellant is not seeking to foreclose its lien as 
against all the property described in the Notice of Lien but 
because Appellant is claiming the total amount of its lien 
a~ against the 34 properties its lien is invalid. Appellant 
devoted much of its original brief pointing out the fact that 
while the lien as filed is in the total amount against each 
property liened still Appellant must rely on the apportion-
able rule in the foreclosure of its lien and the sale of the 
property. Respondent throughout the trial of the case and in 
its brief, and even now appears to be confused in the matter 
of the filing of a lien and proceedings for the foreclosure of 
the lien and sale of the property. 
Again at page 15 Respondent reiterates the fact that be-
cause, as Respondent contends, Appellant is not seeking the 
foreclosure of its lien against 101 properties covered by its 
lien, the lien is unenforceable. It seems that Respondent 
assumes that a lien cannot be foreclosed in more than one 
action. Appellant is seeking and will seek the enforcement 
of its lien as it affects other properties not involved in these 
actions and not affected by those mortgages herein sued on 
by Respondent in another action now pending and in other 
actions to be filed when the building has been completed. 
Appellant takes no issue with those authorities cited by 
Respondent which hold that a single mechanic's lien may not 
be enforced against less than the whole of the property 
liened, that does not mean that the lien may not be enforced 
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in more than one action aand especially is this true where 
as in this case a foreclosure of mortgages is filed against a 
part of the property covered by the lien which requires the 
lien claimant to defend as against such foreclosure. Appel-
lant is not seeking foreclosure of the whole its lien against 
only a portion of the property liened. 
In Rockel on Mechanic's Lien, Sec. 237 page 572 it is 
said: 
""If all of the tract of land that is subject to a lien 
is not described in the complaint and the building 
itself covered all, a decree for the entire tract may 
be had. As a general rule however, only the part of 
the land described in the petition can be held and 
decreed subject to the lien." 
In the Sarginson vs. Turner case, 124 P. 379 quoted 
from by Respondent at page 17, it appears the case was 
decided against the lien claimant because the controlling 
issue was whether the lien claimant contracted with the 
agent for the owner or not and the court found that the 
claimant did not contract with the agent for the owner. 
There is no contention in the instant case by Respondent that 
Mecham was not the agent for the owner of some Schauer-
harner properties or that Mecham was the owner-builder of 
some of the Schauerhamer properties and of the Rowley and 
LaMesa properties. 
Reference is also made by Respondent to the Brannan 
vs. Santa Fe Land Co. case found in 332 P (2d) 892 relied 
on by Appellant and it is argued by Respondent that the 
court attributed the lien to a portion of the property be-
cause it was easily ascertained. It is to be noted however 
that the court and not the lien claimant apportioned the lien 
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and this even though the lien claimant had filed his lien for 
the total amount of its claim against a portion of the property 
on which work and materials were furnished. 
Under Respondent's Point II Respondent again miscon-
strues the contentions of Appellant in its pointing out that 
Appellant by the three cases now before the court seeks 
the foreclosure of it's lien on but 34 properties, however as 
heretofore stated while this is true because of the manner 
in which Appellant was brought into the foreclosure actions 
as a defendant, still appellant looks to the other properties 
on which its materials were furnished and on which it filed 
its lien for satisfaction of its lien as it affects those properties 
through other actions. This is the reason Appellant seeks to 
have the apportionment rule applied by the court. 
At pages 20 and 21 of Respondent's brief Respondent 
sets out some of the findings of the trial court by which the 
court found that Mecham paid a cash consideration to Rowley 
for the four Rowley lots and that Mecham paid $20,000 of 
a $30,000 consideration to Rowleys for the purchase of the 
LaMesa properties. The court should have found that these 
monies were furnished by Respondent and that Mecham had 
no monies with which to purchase either of said properties. 
The other findings set forth on pages 22 and 23 show 
that Mecham treated his venture as one project, working in 
all four areas at one and the same time, and therefore Ap-
pellant's lien was prior in time to the mortgages on Schauer-
harner, Rowley and LaMesa areas because of the furnishing 
of materials on the Keyridge area much earlier than the 
mortgages were filed on the three mentioned areas. Should 
the Honorable Court not agree with this position of Appel-
lant then most certainly the priority of Appellant's lien is 
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established as of the first delivery to Schauerhamer which 
would give priority over the Rowley and LaMesa mortgages. 
Even if Appellant conceded for the purpose of argument 
that Mecham was the owner of all the properties as Re-
spondent contends, and neither Grow, or Grow's companies 
or Respondent were the owners of the properties affected by 
the three actions and of the properties mortgaged by Mecham 
and foreclosed on by Respondent which properties are located. 
in the Schauerhamer, Rowley, and LaMesa areas, then we 
have an Owner-Contractor relationship with the Lien Claim-
ants who would be original contractors and not sub-con-
tractors as was held by this Honorable Court in the case of 
Holbrook vs. Webster's Inc., et al. 320 P2d 661 Mecham 
having admitted that he had but one contract with Appellant 
and one account, then the lien attached as contended for by 
Appellant. It is unimportant that the properties W'ere not 
contiguous. 
In Rockell on Mechanic's Liens, Sec. 135, p. 359 the 
Virginia Code is quoted and considered as follows: 
"Under Virginia Code, 1873, c 115, Sec. 3, 
which provides that 'persons performing labor or 
furnishing materials for the construction, repair or 
improverp.ent of any building or other property shall 
have a lien upon such property', a subcontractor who 
furnishes materials for the construction of two houses 
erected under a single contract on lots on opposite 
sides of a street has a joint lien on both houses and 
lots for the entire amount of materials furnished for 
both houses." 
The Virginia Code is similar to Sec. 38-1-3, UCA 1953. 
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It is evident from the law as stated by Rockell that the 
property liened need not be contiguous and if it can be 
separated by a street then under the same rule of law it can 
be one block, one mile or two miles apart so long as it is 
treated as one project by the contractor in dealing with the 
materialman. The test is, was the building under one con-
tract. Mecham admits that it was. 
Rockell further says at page 361: 
"The fact that at one time the land upon which 
the building is erected was in two tracts will not pre-
vent it from being considered as one, so far as the 
lien is concerned if treated as such by the owner." 
As to the court's having found that Mecham was engaged 
in other building for others, this is unimportant especially as 
to the rights of this Appellant for the reason that it does not 
appear from the evidence that any of the materials furnished 
by Appellant went into other properties than those liened. 
Referring to Point III raised by Respondent, as hereto-
fore pointed out, the bond law was an issue in the case at all 
times and never was abandoned by Appellant. The appor-
tionment rule may be applied under this rule the same as 
under the foreclosure of the lien. There is an abundance of 
evidence, other than that pointed out by Appellant in it's 
brief, showing that all the materials furnished by Appellant 
and used on the four areas were delivered to either the Key-
ridge or LaMesa points of delivery and taken from those 
two points by Mecham's men and used in each house in each 
area as needed. 
Under Respondent's Point IV it states that there is no 
evidence in the record showing that Mecham was instructed 
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by Grow as agent of Respondent to take title in his 
(Mecham's) name and that Respondent would furnish the 
money, and that Respondent was the real party in interest. 
While those exact words may not have been used by the wit-
nesses the meaning was most certainly there as is evident 
from the following portion of the record taken from Mr. 
Bullock's cross examination of Mr. Mecham, page 397. The 
following is the answer given by Mr. Mecham to a question 
propounded by Mr. Bullock: 
A The time we started the last seven houses in 
Schauerhamer, we had discovered that we were 
getting ourselves out on a limb, ready to be 
sawed off. And it was necessary to obtain new 
building, new work, and new money as fast as 
we could to pay the bills on Keyridge, and also 
the other houses being built for Mr. Grow on con-
tract in the Schauerhamer division. Therefore 
we kept-we cut our crew down on Keyridge, 
also on the other two houses designated as lots 
10 and 11, in the Schauer hamer division, there-
by making it possible to build faster on the new 
construction, to pull more money back in to pay 
old bills on Keyridge, and bills that were ac-
cumulating on the houses we had contracts for. 
(page 403) 
Q 
A 
What I want to know is what did you tell Mr. 
Grow with reference to the deal which you had 
with the Rowleys with respect to these four lots? 
In general I told him I had gone ahead with the 
plan of obtaining ground and we were held up 
for the tin1e being by Orem City, so we could 
get permits on LaMesa. This ground was ob-
tainable and it would keep the crew busy while 
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the other ground was being prepared for per-
mits. 
Q Did you tell Mr. Grow that you needed the 
money to pay for the land? 
A I imagine I did. 
Q Do you remember whether you did or not? 
A I don't remember in that many words. He def-
initely knew I needed it. 
Q Why did he know that you needed the money? 
A He knew that that was the reason I was going on 
to new ground, was to build more houses and 
acquire-get a hold of more money so I could 
pay the bills. 
Q Is it your testimony that the transfer of title to 
the Rowley property took place after the trans-
fer of title to the LaMesa? 
A No, that is not my testimony. My testimony is 
that the original deal between myself and the 
Rowleys, with Mr. Grow's consent, was made for 
LaMesa prior to the deal for the Rowley lots. 
Q What arrangements did you have for payment 
on the LaMesa ground? 
A I had previously arranged, with the consent of 
Mr. Grow, to have the property deeded to me, 
and in turn, give the Rowleys a second mortgage 
on the property. Then payment was to come to 
Rowleys from money drawn on those particular 
lots. 
Q From Utah Savings? 
A Yes. 
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Respondent states under Point V that Appellant refused 
to consider apportioning its lien at the pre-trial and at the 
trial of the case. Such is not the case. Upon inquiry being 
made of counsel for Appellant, at both the pre-trial and at the 
trial, if Appellant was claiming the whole of its lien against 
all of the property and each of the tracts and counsel stated 
that it was, which is correct. Counsel stated that it would 
not be possible to show the amount of material charged to 
each property, but at no time did Appellant represent that it 
would not rely on the equitable equal apportionable rule. 
The 52 lot figure was determined from the evidence, the 
fact that Appellant's materials went into 52 of the prop-
erties improved, all of which are covered by Appellant's 
lien, the descriptions of which were taken from information 
furnished to Appellant by Respondent in the Lien Waiver 
requested by Respondent from Appellant. 
At page 30 of Respondent's brief Respondent states that 
there is no evidence as to the value of materials furnished 
by Appellant "to be used" in or upon or actually used in or 
upon any one or group of the 34 properties involved in the 
three actions and that there is no evidence that Appellant 
furnished any materials "to be used" in the Schauerhamer 
or Rowley areas. Mr. Mecham testified to the fact that 
materials furnished under his order by Appellant were used 
in each of the areas and upon each one of the properties and 
that testimony is undisputed and uncontradicted even by Mr. 
Grow. It is evident that the same plans were used in each 
area with a few exterior changes or by the placing of the 
building either long wise or side wise on the lot, and while 
the Schauerhamer, Rowley, and LaMesa houses contained 
a little tnore square foot area, still the houses were sub-
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stantially the same. There is no contradiction of this evi-
dence. 
As to Point VI Respondent states that Appellant's wit-
ness Knudsen admitted he knew of the existence of mortgages 
on the properties. The evidence is substantially to the effect 
that from his experience in the business he had knowledge 
of the fact that building projects were financed through mort-
gage money. He had no actual knowledge of the particular 
mortgages as against a particular property. The fact is that 
in the LaMesa area the mortgages do not describe the prop-
erty on which the improvement was made. 
On page 33 Respondent states that Mrs. Mecham called 
the Notary Public who took Mrs. Mecham's acknowledgment 
over the telephone. We submit that this is not the evidence. 
The evidence is to the effect that Mrs. Mecham talked with 
an employee who testified that she was in the office with the 
Notary and the employee advised the Notary that Mrs. 
Mecham had acknowledged the signing of the instrument to 
her. 
Respondent relies on the Utah case of N orthcrest Inc. vs. 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. 248 P2d 692 in support of its argu-
ment that Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of 
the regularity of the acknowledgment on the mortgages af-
fecting the LaMesa properties. It is Appellant's contention 
that this presumption was overthrown and that it was the 
duty of Respondent to then prove which mortgages it con-
tended were valid. 
As to Point VII regarding the question of estoppel, it is 
the contention of Appellant and Appellant urges that Respon-
dent should be estopped from questioning the validity of Ap-
pellant's lien because of its actions and the part taken by 
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Respondent in dealing with lien claimants through Robert 
1\tlecham. Mecham has not questioned the lien and in all 
fairness, and equity dictates that Respondent should be 
estopped from questioning the validity of this lien. Mr. 
Grow, as agent for Respondent, knew that Mecham was broke 
and that Mecham could not even finish the houses started for 
Grow and his companies in the Keyridge area and still Re-
spondent was willing to finance Mecham in these other areas 
having full knowledge of the fact that Mecham was in debt 
some $150,000. Respondent had full knowledge of the fact 
that monies were being taken from the LeMesa mortgages 
before, as Respondent contends, one stick of lumber had been 
used in LaMesa and before any work had been done in this 
area, and used to pay old bills on Keyridge and to acquire 
land in the LaMesa and Rowley areas. Respondent made it 
possible for Mecham to continue to pile up obligations with 
materialmen who were furnishing materials for the prop-
erties. If Mecham had drawn on the Keyridge area, monies 
in excess of the contract price as Respondent contends on 
pages 38 and 39 of it's brief, it was the obligation of Re-
spondent to put a stop to such action on the part of Mecham 
and to not encourage the continuance of such actions to the 
detriment of others, as it does appear it was to the detriment 
of those dealing with Mecham. Respondent controlled the 
payment of monies realized from the mortgages at all 
times. Mecham did not even know which accounts the 
draws were being charged against. 
Respondent states at page 40 of it's brief that in twenty 
days of trial and in over thirty depositions not a single lien 
claimant, including any witness for Appellant, could or did 
point to any representation made by Respondent, Cross-
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defendants, or any of them, whereby any lien claimant was 
misled into extending credit to Mecham, or respecting the 
ownership of any of the properties. We submit that the 
record is filled with statements and particularly acts and 
conduct on the part of Respondent which misled lien claim-
ants and which induced them to continue to furnish their 
materials to the properties and to extend credit to Mecham. 
Respondent argues that because of the incompetence and 
mis-management of Mecham all parties including Respon-
dent have suffered a great loss. In this Appellant agrees, but 
Respondent was in a position to have put a stop to such 
action at any time, which it failed and refused to do. 
Under Respondent's Point VIII it would have the court 
treat the transaction between Mecham and Appellant as though 
Mecham had operated a plumbing business from the two 
points of warehousing of materials, but the evidence will not 
bear out such contention. The evidence is uncontradicted to 
the effect that all the materials charged for by Appellant and 
for whirJ1 it's lien was filed were received and used by 
Mecham upon the properties liened. From the authorities 
cited by Respondent under its Point VIII, Respondent would 
have this Honorable Court reverse the decision handed down 
by this Honorable Court in the Sierra Nevada Lbr. Co. vs .. 
Whitmore case. As an example of those cases on which Re-
spondent relies, in the Tabet vs. Davenport case cited at page 
44 it appears from the facts in that case that a large portion 
of the materials delivered were delivered to a plumbing com-
pany warehouse which was not even on the property liened., 
and even placed in bins with like materials. Therefore this 
Honorable Court should not be pursuaded by such decisions. 
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The judgment of the trial court should therefore be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN, of 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
